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Abstract. Secure messaging applications have been used for the purposes of ma-
jor crime, creating the need for forensic research into the area. This paper foren-
sically analyses two secure messaging applications, Wickr and Telegram, to re-
cover artefacts from and then to compare them to reveal the differences between 
the applications.  The artefacts were created on Android platforms by using the 
secure features of the applications, such as ephemeral messaging,  the channel 
function and encrypted conversations. The results of the experiments docu-
mented in this paper give insight into the organisation of the data structures by 
both Wickr and Telegram, as well as the exploration of mobile digital forensics 
techniques to recover artefacts removed by the ephemeral functions. 
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1 Introduction 
Wickr and Telegram are Secure Messaging Applications (SMAs), with an estimated 1- 
5 and 100-500 million installs on Android Platforms respectively [1]. The popularity of 
SMAs, while a great tool for change and communication for many, have also seen them 
used for major crimes. In 2015, there was a huge spike in acts of terrorism in both 
European countries and around the world [2, 3]. While terror attacks are not new, some 
recent events have seen a new trend: the usage of social media and networking by ter-
rorist groups, for the proliferation of their causes [4, 5, 6]. Whether used for co-ordina-
tions, communications or recruitments, the need for forensic analysis and a greater un-
derstanding of the SMAs has never been more urgent. 
The capitalization of mobile applications by markets such as Google Play [1] and 
the iTunes App Store [7] has driven the advent of new functionality for all applications, 
including SMAs.  In this age of information, the demand for secure methods of com-
munication has increased. SMAs ensure privacy of communications, which regardless 
of the implications, present a challenge to the digital forensic investigators because of 
the intentional obfuscation and removal of artefacts, which hampers investigations, of-
ten by increasing the amount of time and money invested, eventually reducing the like-
lihood of a successful completion [8].  
This paper will forensically analyse two secure messaging applications, Wickr [9] 
and Telegram [10]. These applications were chosen with their features in mind. Both 
apps have an ephemeral messaging function. Ephemeral messaging is a relatively novel 
and popular way of social networking. Ephemeral messaging applications (EMA) use 
transient data, data that are permitted to exist for a limited amount of time before they 
become inaccessible, by obfuscation or deletion. An example of an EMA that rose to 
huge popularity among the eighteen to thirty-four year old age range (which happens 
to be statistically the largest demographic for smartphone ownership in the United 
States [11]) was SnapChat [12], an application that allowed users to send photos and 
images that would be deleted after opening. SnapChat brought EMAs into general 
knowledge and since then, many other applications have adopted the ephemeral feature, 
including SMAs.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes related work, 
similar forensic research into various types of secure and non-secure social media ap-
plications. Section 3 covers the experimental setup used, including acquisition types, 
forensic tools and methods used, and the chosen Android test platforms. Sections 4 and 
5 reports the experimental results, and finally Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2 Related Work 
Messaging applications on mobile platforms arose from the low-cost of mobile internet 
compared to individual Short Message Service (SMS) messages [13]. Internet messag-
ing also allows for the easy transmission of multimedia messages. Adoption of security 
measures such as encryption and ephemeral functions came from security concerns due 
to hacking attacks and privacy issues [14, 15]. Mutawa et al. [16] conducted research 
into three popular social networking applications: Facebook, Twitter and MySpace on 
iOS, Android and Blackberry platforms. The applications were installed on the test 
platforms and scenarios were created by logging in and using their features, inputting a 
list of keywords that would later be used in searching for artefacts. The acquisition of 
data was performed by rooting the device, which was necessary as without rooting, 
areas of the device where some artifacts are stored cannot be accessed [16]. Wu et al. 
[17] investigated two ephemeral messaging applications: SnapChat and Burner on iOS 
and Android platforms. Physical acquisition of the platforms and subsequent analysis 
revealed that the transient data from SnapChat, once expired, was not securely re-
moved, and in some cases only the filename had been changed, which lead to recovery 
of artefacts. Since the release of SnapChat, ephemeral messaging applications have 
adopted a focus on security. The latest includes applications such as Wickr and Tele-
gram, which function as a normal messaging application, but offer a heightened focus 
on security.  
Walnycky et al. [18] conducted investigations into a wide range of mobile messaging 
applications. Using the recovery and analysis of the database file for each respective 
app, a group of applications were analysed, including Wickr, which was identified as 
having no vulnerabilities, as in no artefacts were recovered due to encryption. Another 
investigation into Wickr carried out by Mehrotra et al. [19] using a pre-analysis scenario 
creation method found no artefacts related to Wickr. The investigation employed a 
backup of the Android platform and used string searches to analyse the acquired data. 
The lack of results was caused by Wickr’s extensive use of encryption in its data storage 
techniques.  
Satrya et al. [20] analysed Telegram on Android devices, finding that the application 
uses a database to store messages, as well as other storage locations for sent and re-
ceived files. The methodology used in [20] highlighted three areas of interest, including 
the Telegram “.apk” installer package, the internal storage directory, and the 
“cache4.db” database. The “cache4.db” database was SQLite formatted, and was logi-
cally acquired using a backup program before being analysed with SQLite Database 
Browser.  
3 Experimental Setup 
The investigation reported in this paper focussed on the ephemeral messaging functions 
on both Wickr and Telegram and also the channel feature of Telegram. As well as ex-
panding on the research carried out by Satyra et al. [20] by incorporating Telegram’s 
Channel, the experiments were conducted using physical data acquisition and analysis, 
which has not been previously carried out in the context of both applications. A variety 
of different forensic analysis methods were used to recover artefacts from both Wickr 
and Telegram. Due to the differences in the security measures taken by the applications, 
such as encryption, the methods and artefacts for each vary. The flow of experimental 
work started with the initial step of scenario creation, followed by logical analysis of 
data. If data examined were encrypted, then the methodology focussed on the analysis 
of the application itself and its ephemeral data. If plaintext data were recovered, analy-
sis of the artefacts and ephemeral data followed. In any case, Random Access Memory 
(RAM) acquisition and analysis were completed to recover artefacts. 
3.1 Data Acquisition 
The acquisition methods used in this paper can be divided into two categories, logical 
and physical. Logical data acquisition in this context refers to the use of the device’s 
filesystem to recover files. In this case, the chosen method of logical acquisition was 
ADB pull, a command from the Android Debug Bridge [21], a set of tools used for 
development and testing of Android applications.  
The physical acquisition method used in this context was to create a bit-for-bit copy 
of the target platforms’ “user” partition, which on Android stores all files related to user 
activity, including both application information and personal files. To create the copy, 
the tool Data Dump (dd) [22] was used. Other Android partitions, including the cache 
and the system partition were also acquired and analysed using a string search, however 
in this case no related artefacts were recovered, so these partitions were not included in 
the scope of the investigation. 
In addition to the recovery of data from the Android platform’s secondary storage, 
the Random Access Memory (RAM) of the device was also acquired. An application 
for android called Memory Dump [23] was used for this purpose. Memory Dump al-
lows the user to choose an application running on the platform and acquire the memory 
associated with that application. This is useful in cases of encryption, as encrypted data 
may be stored in plaintext format in RAM when in use, for ease of access by the appli-
cation. 
3.2 Wickr 
Wickr is a highly secure messaging application. Offering “privacy by design” [9], its 
simple easy to use interface hides an array of anti-forensics techniques, such as encryp-
tion of local data and network traffic [18], as well as ephemeral messaging features. In 
the face of such features, forensics techniques such as pre-analysis scenario creation 
and string searching acquired data fall down [18, 19]. Instead of recovering artefacts, 
the application and its effect on the Android platform, were analysed for a greater un-
derstanding in a forensic context.  
The Wickr application itself is stored on the Android platform in the form of an 
“.apk” installer package. Inside this package is a file called “classes.dex”, which is a 
file containing all the definitions for the functions of the application. To extract the 
“classes.dex” file, the “.apk” was opened using the archive extraction utility in Win-
dows, and the file was extracted. To analyse the file, it was converted to a Java archive. 
A specialised tool exists for this purpose, called “dex2jar” [24]. The output from this 
tool is a Java archive that was analysed using another tool, Java Decompiler [25]. When 
analysed, the file revealed all the class definitions for Wickr, which gives an insight 
into how it operates. 
To analyse the files associated with Wickr, the application’s data directory 
(“/data/data/com.mywickr.wickr2”) was logically acquired. To find out how the 
ephemeral data function works in Wickr, the data directory was acquired multiple times 
at different stages of the test scenario. These were: before messages were received, after 
messages had been received, after messages had been removed by the ephemeral func-
tion and after the “secure shredder” had been run. The “secure shredder” offers the 
shredding of deleted data. The various acquired versions of the directories were ana-
lysed and compared to look for any changes in files as well as the size of Wickr’s da-
tabase “wickr_db”.  
The physically acquired image was analysed in Autopsy 3.0.8 [26]. Autopsy is the 
graphical frontend for a set of Linux forensics tools called the Sleuthkit. This contains 
tools that allow for the recovery of deleted data. Autopsy also allows for the processing 
of unallocated space, which is an important part of the analysis as ephemeral messaging 
functions rely on the deletion of data. Artefacts such as files sent as attachments to 
messages that had been deleted via the ephemeral messaging function were recovered 
using Autopsy. 
3.3 Telegram 
Telegram is a feature-rich messaging application that also incorporates security into its 
operation, by adding end-to-end encryption as well as ephemeral messaging. Telegram 
offers a unique way of communication called the channel feature. Introduced in 2015 
with the version 3.2.1 [27], this feature allows any user to start a channel which can 
either be public or private. Any other Telegram user can locate public channels using 
the search function, whereas private channel rely on an invite-only URL based system. 
Once the channel is established, owners and admins broadcast material to all subscrib-
ers. Telegram’s channel feature was used by an active terrorist organisation to dissem-
inate propaganda [28], which highlights the potential for the features use in major 
crime, and creates the need for forensic analysis. 
The work carried out by Satrya et al. [20] established methods of recovering mes-
sages sent via Telegram, recovering artefacts by logically acquiring the “cache4.db” 
database file from the platform, which was analysed using SQLite Database Browser 
[29]. In our work, the channel feature was analysed using this methodology to reveal 
additional artefacts related to channels. In addition to this, artefacts related to the 
ephemeral messaging function were recovered by analysing the physically acquired 
image using Autopsy, as mentioned in section 3.2.  
To locate where remnant channel messages may be stored on the test platform, the 
filesystem clusters of the “cache4.db” database had to be identified. As Android uses a 
UNIX-like filesystem, EXT4, this information is stored in a meta-structure known as 
an “inode”. After identifying the “inode” of the “cache4.db” database by mounting the 
physically acquired image and using the “ls” command, the tool “istat” from the Sleuth-
kit [26] was used to identify filesystem clusters. . The tool “istat” was used to print out 
the “inode” statistics from the physically acquired image for examination of data. The 
output of “istat” can be seen in Figure 1 - under “Direct Blocks”, importantly, the clus-
ters on which the file was stored can be seen. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Output of the “istat” command for Telegram’s “cache4.db” database. 
To examine the clusters, the physically acquired image was opened in the hex editor 
WinHex [30]. To locate the data from the list of clusters, a simple calculation [31] was 
made to find the byte offset of the clusters: 
 
 B = C * SpC * S (1) 
Where B is the byte offset in bytes, C is the cluster number, SpC is the sectors per 
cluster and S is the sector size in bytes. In the case of the test platform, the SpC was 8 
and S was 512, so the calculation was performed as per the chosen cluster. A specific 
add-on for Telegram, offered by Oxygen Forensic Suite 2014 [32], was used to recover 
encrypted messages. Oxygen Forensic Suite 2014 also provides a file browser for view-
ing and recovering files stored as attachments, however, Oxygen Forensic Suite 2014 
is limited to active files, i.e. files that have not been deleted [33]. Later versions (2015 
onwards) do support recovery of deleted files [32]; however, in this case, Autopsy 3.0.8 
was used. 
3.4 Linux Utilities  
When examining data on a Linux forensic workstation, basic file utilities, such as “ls”, 
“cat”, “strings” and “grep” were used to examine directory structures and files. The tool 
“strings” extracts all string format data from a file. A bash script was created to perform 
string searches on the output of the strings utility. The script is shown in Figure 2. The 
first part of the script’s command, cat, sends the saved “strings” output to the second 
part, grep, which searches for matches to a keyword dictionary, and saves the results to 
a new file. This technique was used to search the physically acquired images for key-
words relating to the respective application, as well as the live memory acquisition files. 
 
 
Fig. 2. String search bash script. 
3.5 Platforms 
A Samsung Galaxy S4 Mini [34] was the primary platform used for the experimental 
setup. An AllWinner A13 Android tablet [35] was used as an alternate platform in order 
to ensure the repeatability of all experiments performed, as well as sending and receiv-
ing messages to and from the test platform. The choice of test platform in this case, a 
phone from Samsung’s flagship galaxy range, reflects the current state of the worldwide 
smartphone market, which is dominated by Android [36], the market for which is in 
turn dominated by Samsung [36]. Another reason for choosing Android was its large 
online developer community, which stems from its open source status. The applications 
were both installed on the platform using Android’s built-in app store, Google Play [1]. 
The test platforms and the application versions used are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Android platforms and application versions. 
Name 
Specifications 
Model 
number 
Android 
version 
Kernel version 
Wickr 
version 
Telegram 
version 
Samsung 
Galaxy S4 
Mini [34] 
GT-
I9195I 4.4.4 (KitKat) 3.10.28-5334500 
2.6.4.1 3.10.1 
AllWinner 
A13 [35] 
Q8 4.4.2 (KitKat) 3.4.39 2.6.4.1 N/A 
 
Once the applications were installed on the test platform, scenarios were created by 
creating accounts on the respective applications and using the features, to simulate a 
suspect’s device. As the apps differ in their features somewhat, the artefacts creation 
procedure also slightly differed. To test both the regular and ephemeral messaging 
functions, messages were sent with identifiable text, as well as attachments, to the test 
platform. For Wickr, these messages simulated a conversation which included an 
attachment, a picture (.jpg) file, as well as some key words. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Established scenario on Telegram. 
For Telegram, the scenario creation involved both the creation of, and subscription 
to channels. In addition to creating custom channels, a number of public channels were 
subscribed to also, which meant that the messages recieved via these channels were 
included in the list of potential artefacts. Unlike Wickr, in Telegram’s scenario more 
messages were required to utilise the channel function. For this purpose, bulk text was 
copied from the internet, as seen in Figure 3. The range of artefacts recovered from both 
standard conversations and channels included message text, files (images and 
documents) and usernames. Due to the inclusion of channel function in Telegram, the 
number of artefacts incoroprated in the analysis was more than Wickr’s. 
4 Results for Wickr  
Analysis of the installer package for Wickr revealed the techniques it uses to store data. 
When applications store data in databases, they sometimes use a programming object 
called a “Database Helper”. In Wickr’s case, the class of functions called 
“WickrDBAdapter.class” reveals the use of “SqlCipher”, a database encryption library 
for SQLite. The use of such a library explains why any messages recieved by Wickr 
were not stored in plain text. An extract from the “WickrDBAdapter.class” is shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Extract from “WickrDBAdapter.class”. 
Acquisition and analysis of Wickr’s associated data as described in Section 3.2 re-
vealed how the ephemeral function of Wickr worked. The results of comparison of the 
acquired data are shown in Table 2, which show that on a logical level, the presence of 
encrypted “.wic” files correlates with the status of stored messages in Wickr. The 
results in Table 2 reveal that the ephemeral function removed the data, at least logically. 
The process of the ephemeral function caused the start of file decay: firstly the files 
were logically deleted.  
The proposed operation of Wickr’s file decay is shown in Table 3, which 
demonstrates the varying levels of file storage and deletion in Wickr at the stages listed 
in Table 2. As the results of Table 2 rely on logical acquisition, analysis of the 
physically acquired images of the Android platform was required to further investigate 
the deletion process and recover deleted artefacts. Navigating to the Wickr data 
directory on the physically acquired image using Autopsy revealed filesystem 
references to previously present “.wic” files. A screenshot of this is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Table 2. Wickr data analysis results. 
Stage of file 
removal  
(arbitrary) 
Secure 
shredder 
 status 
Copy taken Files directory and  
further observations 
1 Before Before images 
were received 
Only two “.wic” files, “pcc.wic” and 
“pcd.wic” were present in the files di-
rectory. 
2 Before After  images 
were re-
ceived 
Two “.wic” files, each with 64 char-
acter string file names, were present in 
the files directory. Their sizes were 
47488 and 54136 bytes respectively. 
3 Before After images 
were removed 
Two “.wic” files were not present. 
4 After After images 
were removed 
Two “.wic” files were not present. 
Table 3. Model of Wickr’s file decay. 
Stage of file 
removal 
(arbitrary) 
1 2 3 4 
Status of re-
ceived file 
N/A File present,  
encrypted, stored 
in .wic file 
File present, 
 encrypted, filesys-
tem header removed 
File overwritten 
with random or 
null data 
Process required 
to recover file 
N/A Logical level  
acquisition, for 
example copy. 
Low level acquisi-
tion, such as device 
data dump or chip-
off analysis 
File  
unrecoverable. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Files subdirectory of Wickr’s data directory in Autopsy. 
Finally, analysis of the RAM dump acquired using the method described in Section 
3.1 revealed that, much like the other areas of storage, Wickr does not expose much 
data and analysis found very few artefacts. Using the string search method described in 
Section 3.4, the dumped RAM data was analysed. The results are shown in Table 4. 
Any field within the “< … >” parenthesis represents information which was omitted 
for privacy purposes. 
Table 4. Results of Wickr’s RAM dump string search. 
Search  
expression 
Reason Results 
wickr Name of the App. Returned paths of files in the data  
directory of Wickr, as well as extracts 
from various core Wickr libraries. 
<Hidden> Password used to register wickr account No Matches. 
cccumobilef Username used to register wickr account Matching String found in 
dumped__7428b000-7428e000_rw-p 
dump file. 
ocelotorus Username of account used in scenario No matches. 
an.jpg Filename of picture uploaded – file 
 extension added because “an” too ambigu-
ous 
No matches 
invicta See above No matches. 
goods Excerpts from messages sent in  
pre-analysis scenario creation 
No pertinent matches. 
Yes See above. No pertinent matches. 
meet See above. No pertinent matches. 
 
The results in Table 4 show that Wickr does not store information such as received 
messages in plaintext in RAM. However, a single artefact, the name of the account used 
to sign up to Wickr, was found. The account name could be used in co-operation with 
Wickr and telecom services to locate the user that signed up using the captured device. 
This artefact was not reported in the work carried out previously by Walnycky et al. 
[18] and Mehrotra et al. [19], which used searching of Wickr’s stored data. 
5 Results for Telegram   
The standard messaging capabilities of Telegram are divided into two separate features: 
normal and secret chats. Normal chats use a server to store messages and employ client-
server encryption, while during secret chats the involved platforms communicate with 
each other directly and employ end-to-end encryption [10]. Upon analysis using SQLite 
Database Browser, the messages received via channels were stored in the same way as 
normal messages, established before by Satyra et al. [20], with an additional artefact, 
the link to join a private channel. In the database, these artefacts was identified using 
the UID column, which was unique to the conversation. Figure 6 shows the suspect 
channel, “test channel (create)”, identified in the chats table of the “cache4.db” 
database. The UID was captured from the selected entry as shown in Figure 6. Records 
were retrieved from the messages table using this UID. The status of the out column in 
the messages table identifies the suspect’s platform as being an owner or admin of the 
suspect channel, as the value of “1” in the out column shown in Figure 6 denotes the 
messages were sent. Corresponding entries in the chat settings table revealed the private 
URL which was used to join the channel, as seen in Figure 7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Suspect channel in Chats Table of Telegram’s “cache4.db” database. 
 
Fig. 7. Retrieval of channel join link in Telegram’s “cache4.db” database. 
In a real world scenario, it is possible that channels are un-followed or other anti-
forensics measures are taken preceding the capture of the target platform. In order to 
examine messages left over from un-followed or deleted channels, the “cache4.db” file 
was examined on the imaged physical user partition. Using WinHex to examine the 
data at the byte with the technique mentioned in Section 3.3 revealed artefacts from the 
public Telegram channels subscribed to during the scenario creation. These messages 
remained in the “cache4.db” database even though the channel had been unfollowed 
and was no longer accessible via the normal interface. Figure 8 shows a message viewed 
in WinHex at byte offset 274431264. Files received via channels were stored in the 
“Telegram” directory on the internal storage, which has the absolute path of “/data/me-
dia/0/Telegram/” [20]. Upon unfollowing of channels, the files received from these 
channels are still present, lacking signs of deletion.   
 
 
Fig. 8. Messages from unfollowed channel. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Recovery of expired image using Autopsy. 
The secret chat in Telegram offers an ephemeral messaging function, the self-de-
struct timer, which allows users to set expiry dates for the conversation. Before the 
message from the test scenario expired, examination of Telegram’s cache directory lo-
cated at “/data/media/0/Android/data/org.telegram.messenger/cache” [17] showed the 
presence of the file, stored as “1052861977929449485_1299364215.jpg”, as well as 
few accompanying thumbnails. Upon expiry, the message was no longer accessible 
from the normal interface, and was no longer present in the cache. However, this ex-
pired image file was recovered in the cache directory on the physical image when Au-
topsy’s file browser tool was used, as shown in Figure 9. It was found that in this case, 
the file system entry was removed after the expiry; however, the file was still present 
in the device. These findings reveal that Telegram uses a logical deletion process to 
handle ephemeral message attachments, allowing for the recovery of expired multime-
dia messages using physical acquisition and examination of the captured device.  
Table 5. Results of Telegram’s RAM analysis. 
Search Expression Reason Results 
<First name> First name used to create 
Telegram account, poten-
tially identifying artefact. 
Matching string found in 
dumped__78ea2000-78fd7000_rw-p and 
dumped__7a993000-7a99c000_rw-p dump 
files. 
<Second Name> Surname name used to cre-
ate Telegram account, po-
tentially identifying arte-
fact. 
Matching string found in 
dumped__78ea2000-78fd7000_rw-p and 
dumped__7a993000-7a99c000_rw-p dump 
files. 
<Phone Number> Phone number used to sign 
up to Telegram account, po-
tentially identifying arte-
fact. 
No matches found. 
+44 National mobile telephony 
prefix 
A number of matches related to Graphical 
User Interface (GUI), but no identifying arte-
facts. 
magnetic Excerpts from messages 
sent in pre-analysis scenario 
creation 
A number of matching strings found in 
dumped__77cb0000-77cb9000_rw-p dump 
file, among others. 
overwrite See above A number of matching strings found in 
dumped__77cb0000-77cb9000_rw-p dump 
file, among others. 
 
Table 5 reports the results of Telegram’s RAM analysis which was acquired using 
the method described in Section 3.1 and analysed using the string search method de-
scribed in Section 3.4. Results revealed the recovery of many plaintext artefacts. Fields 
within the “< … >” parenthesis represents confidential information which was omitted 
due to privacy purposes. 
6 Conclusions  
The experiments in this paper provided understanding of the manner in which secure 
messaging applications like Wickr and Telegrams store their data.  Results revealed 
that the Wickr stored it’s recieved messages in encrpyted “.wic” files in the data 
directory. While the messages did cause the production of “.wic” files, they did not 
affect the size of the application’s database.  Unlike Wickr, in the case of Telegram, the 
standard forensics tools had built-in modules to recover encrypted artefacts. Our 
analyses documented these artefacts in geater detail, including information relating to 
the joining of channels, and the recovery of messages after the channels had been 
unfollowed. The RAM dump technique for Wickr recovered a plaintext account 
username, which was valid only in the context of live analysis where the phone had not 
been turned off since being captured. Like Wickr, The RAM dump was also succesful 
in recovering Telegram’s plaintext artifacts, which shows the integrity of this method 
in analysing similar applications. The direction of future research will focus on the 
decryption techniques and also the application of proposed methods in analysing 
similar SMAs on other popular platforms such as iOS and Windows Phones. 
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